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Tot Grigore Gafencu – „Invatamintele istoriei”

Adrian Năstase4 comentarii

Articolul „Invatamintele istoriei” reprezinta raspunsul lui Gafencu la un amplu articol al lui Pamfil Seicaru, din 1951, intitulat „Politica aistorica”. Seicaru analiza politica externa a Romaniei in perioada premergatoare ultimatumului sovietic din 1940, criticandu-l si pe Gafencu, pentru pozitia sa de la Externe.

Textul figureaza intr-un volum cuprinzand articole, discursuri si interviuri din presa exilului, publicat de Institutul pentru memoria exilului romanesc.

Raspunsul lui Gafencu a aparut in 1952. El subliniaza, de la inceput, ca judecarea trecutului apropiat cere „insusiri deosebite de nepartinire si de probitate sufleteasca” si ca cine se intoarce din drum, apasat de necazuri vechi si nepotolite si intinde spre trecut un deget acuzator, nu izbuteste de cele mai multe ori sa dea la iveala decat neastamparul acelor fantome care tulbura propria sa constiinta.

In esenta, fostul ministru de externe explica de ce au fost acceptate de catre Romania garantiile franco-engleze, intr-un moment in care exista inca speranta opririi razboiului. „Apararea in comun a unor interese comune… e o metoda de politica externa care nu poate face minuni dar care e totusi cea mai potrivita ca sa ocroteasca ‘siguranta’ unei tari. Straduintele lui Titulescu, atat de crunt batjocorite azi de unii amatori de gandire politica, au dat gres fiindca in sprijinul unei idei juste nu au fost stranse din vreme fortele trebuincioase. Niumeni insa nu a fost in stare sa propuna o idee mai buna…”

Cred totusi ca si analiza lui Pamfil Seicaru merita citita cu atentie.

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  3. JULY 1940
    No. 164
    104/112312-13
    The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
    Telegram
    most urgent Moscow, July 13, 1940—9 : 17 p. m.
    secret Received July 14—9 : 15 a. m.
    No. 1364 of July 13
    Molotov informed me today that Cripps, the British Ambassador
    here, had been received by Stalin a few days ago upon request of the
    British Government. On instructions from Stalin, Molotov gave me a memorandum of this conversation.
    Cripps inquired regarding the attitude of the Soviet Government
    toward the following questions :

    1. The British Government was convinced that Germany was striving for hegemony in Europe and wanted to engulf all European countries. This was dangerous to the Soviet Union as well as England.
    Therefore both countries ought to agree on a common policy of self- protection against Germany and on the re-establishment of the European balance of power.

    2. Irrespective of this, England would like to trade with the Soviet Union, provided that England’s exports would not be resold to
    Germany.

    3. The British Government was of the opinion that unification and leadership of the Balkan countries for the purpose of maintaining the status quo was rightly the task of the Soviet Union. In present circumstances this important mission could be carried out only by the Soviet Union.

    4. The British Government knew that the Soviet Union was dissatisfied with the regime in the Straits and in the Black Sea. Cripps was of the opinion that the interests of the Soviet Union in the Straits must be safeguarded

    Stalin’s answers are given as follows :

    1. The Soviet Government was, of course, very much interested in present events in Europe, but he (Stalin) did not see any danger of the hegemony of any one country in Europe and still less any danger that Europe might be engulfed by Germany. Stalin observed the policy of Germany, and knew several leading German statesmen well. He had not discovered any desire on their part to engulf European countries. Stalin was not of the opinion that German military successes menaced the Soviet Union and her friendly relations with Germany. These relations were not based on transient
    circumstances, but on the basic national interests of both countries. The so-called European balance of power had hitherto oppressed not only Germany, but also the Soviet Union. Therefore the Soviet Union would take all measures to prevent the re-establishment of the old balance of power in Europe

    2. The Soviet Union did not object to trading with England, but she contested the right of England or any other country to interfere with German-Soviet commercial relations. The Soviet Union would export to Germany, in accordance with treaty provisions, part of the nonferrous metals she bought abroad, because Germany needed these metals for the manufacture of the war material she delivered to the Soviet Union. If England did not recognize these conditions, trade between England and the Soviet Union was impossible.

    3. In Stalin’s opinion no power had the right to an exclusive role in the consolidation and leadership of the Balkan countries. The Soviet Union did not claim such a mission either, although she was interested in Balkan affairs.

    4. Regarding Turkey Stalin declared that the Soviet Union was in fact opposed to the exclusive jurisdiction of Turkey over the Straits and to Turkey’s dictation of conditions in the Black Sea. The Turkish Government was aware of that.[1]

    SCHULENBURG

    [1]
    *In telegram No. 1227 of July 17 Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg to tell Molotov that the memorandum on the Stalin-Cripps conversation had been transmitted to the German Government which „took note of the contents of the memorandum with interest and greatly appreciated this information.”
    (270/175458)

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